Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Caren Bischel v. Heather J. Merritt, and Salt Lake
County : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas E. Short; Salt Lake County Attorney; Michael E. Postma; Deputy County Attorney.
Samuel King.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bischel v. Merritt, No. 940559 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6214

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOC
KFU
50
DOCKET NO. .-' H U ^
DOCK

>J

—

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CAREN BISCHEL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 940559-CA

HEATHER J. MERRITT, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAREN BISCHEL

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
SALT LAKE COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH

Douglas E. Short
Salt Lake County Attorney
Michael E. Postma
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
468-3300

Samuel King
Attorney at Law
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
486-3751

FILED
MAY 3 01995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CAREN BISCHEL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 940559-CA

HEATHER J. MERRITT, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAREN BISCHEL

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
SALT LAKE COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH

Douglas E. Short
Salt Lake County Attorney
Michael E. Postma
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
468-3300

Samuel King
Attorney at Law
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
486-3751

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW

1

DEFENDANTS STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS—3
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

8

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

9

ISSUE NO. I
PLAINTIFF ADOPTED THE INCORRECT STANDARD
OF REVIEW TO CONTROL THIS APPEAL
ISSUE NO. II
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE A PROPER NOTICE
OF CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT

9

10

ISSUE NO.Ill
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED AGAINST
DEFENDANTS

10

ISSUE NO. IV
STRICT COMPLIANCE IS REQUIRED BY UTAH COURTS,
NOT HYPERTECHNICALITY

12

ISSUE NO. V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF FEES
AND COSTS IN THIS APPEAL

12

CONCLUSION

13

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P. 2d 1182 (Utah App.
1987)

PAGE

2

Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 2 24 Utah Adv.
Rep. 11 (July 29, 1994)
14

STATUTES
78-51-26(4), Utah Code Annotated

6

RULES
Rule 8(d), U.R.C.P.

2

Rule 11, U.R.C.P.

6

Rule 56(d), (e), U.R.C.P.

2

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
D.R. 7-101(3), (5).

6

-ii-

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 1)
Jurisdiction agreed.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 1)
The parties differ only on phraseology of the issues,

STANDARD OF REVIEW
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2)
Issue joined.

No new material.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2)
Issue joined.

No new material.

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2)
1.

The key facts now seem to be in agreement, although not

whole-heartedly conceded by Defendant.
2.

This is a major change from Defendant's pleadings before

the Trial Court (Plaintiff's original Brief Exhibits 2, 4 and 7),
in which none of the key facts were conceded by Defendant.
Reference in this Reply to Exhibits refer to that Brief.
3.

The key fact admissions are at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of

Defendant's Statement of the Facts at page 3.
4.

At paragraph 3 Defendant says Plaintiff "alleges" her

counsel was instructed by the Salt Lake County Commission to file
a notice of claim with the Salt Lake County Attorney.
1

Plaintiff

filed verified pleadings concerning these facts. (Exhibits 3, 6,
and 8)

Defendant states no differing facts.

deny that allegation.

Defendant does not

As the facts are in Defendant's file,

Plaintiff deems the allegation admitted for purposes of this
appeal. Rules 8(d) and 56(d),(e), U.R.C.P. Koulis v. Standard Oil
Company. , 746 P. 2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987).

(If party on appeal

does not state facts affirmatively, with cites to record, those
facts are deemed admitted as verified by opposing party.)
5.

Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Statement of Facts (page 3)

states similarly that Plaintiff's attorney "alleges" he spoke with
Trish McDonald of the Salt Lake County Attorneys Office who
directed him to file Plaintiff's claim with her, corroborating the
advice given him by the County Commission.

Now either Trish told

Plaintiff's counsel to send the claim to her or she didn't.
is a simple specific fact known to Defendant.

This

It would help if it

said "yes" or "no", not "alleged."
6.
County

At paragraph 5, Defendant acknowledges that the Salt Lake
Attorney, acting

as

agent

for

the

Salt

Lake

County

Commission, negotiated Plaintiff's claim.
7.

Defendant's concession of negotiation is without caveat.

The factual importance of that concession should be analyzed.
8.
Defendant

Exhibit

1, Plaintiff's claim notice, is stamped by

"Received,

April

23,

1993,

County

Attorney

Risk

Management." This entity handles civil claims for the County. The
County Attorney did not negotiate for itself.

The claim was

against the County, so it negotiated for the County. From this it

2

follows that if the County negotiated Plaintiff's claim, that the
County accepted the claim as being properly served.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 5)
Issues exist.
The points of Defendant's Brief are answered in sequence as
numbered by Defendant.
Point 1.

(Defendant's Brief page 5).

Defendant claims Plaintiff expanded the facts of paragraphs 3
and 4 of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts beyond those presented to
the Trial Court.
At paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiff's Verified Answer to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Plaintiff's Brief, Ex. 3) these
facts are specifically alleged under oath by Plaintiff's counsel.
They were presented to the Trial Court.
Point 2.

(Defendant's Brief page 5).

Defendant objects that paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Statement of
Facts is a conclusion not supported by the record.
Paragraph 5 is supported by the record.

It is covered

specifically in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Paragraphs 5 - 1 0 .
Point 3.

(Defendant's Brief page 5).

Defendant

objects to the second

and third

sentences of

paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts.
What is really important here is what Defendant concedes - the
first sentence.
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Defendant

admits

the

first

sentence

which

states

that

Plaintiff's counsel negotiated with the Salt Lake County Attorney.
This is a major concession for the reasons pointed out, supra, page
2 at paragraphs 5 - 7.
Defendant

contends

Plaintiff's

second

sentence

was

not

submitted to the Trial Court.
These facts were specifically stated by Plaintiff to the Trial
Court (Ex. 3, Paragraph 9).
Plaintiff admits the third sentence of Plaintiff's paragraph
6 is in error.

The County does not dispute the fact that it did,

during negotiations, pay for the damage to Plaintiff's vehicle.
However, on reexamination of the record, this fact was not brought
to the attention of the Trial Court by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff submits that, within its discretion, this Court
should consider that fact as it is not in issue. Defendant has in
its file Plaintiff's vehicle damage estimate and its cancelled
check issued in May, 199 3, paying that damage in the sum of
$680.00.

This was

settlement

of

Salt Lake County money paid

Plaintiff's

claim.

It

verifies

in partial
Plaintiff's

contention that Defendant acknowledged her claim was properly
served.

Why else would it issue its check?

Point 4.

(Defendant's Brief page 6).

Defendant

objects to all of paragraph

8 of Plaintiff's

Statement of Facts as not being presented to the Trial Court.
Plaintiff disagrees.
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The accident facts are covered in subparagraphs A and B
(Plaintiff's Brief page 5). These are the same facts originally
submitted to the County in Plaintiff's Notice of Claim (Exhibit 1).
Plaintiff's claim letter (Exhibit 1) is the one piece of
evidence absolutely not in issue.

Defendant annexed it to its

Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit 2). Does Defendant suggest only the
addressee line, but not the content , was before the Trial Court?
If there is a point here, it is that this objection illustrates
Defendant's reticence.
Plaintiff's subparagraph C (Plaintiff's Brief page 6), simply
explains the facts and the negotiations covered in Plaintiff's
paragraphs A and B. The same material is specifically covered in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, paragraph 9, page 3.
Point 5.

(Defendant's Brief page 6).

Defendant objects to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Statement of
Facts

(Plaintiff's Brief page 6), that "the Salt Lake County

Attorney not only knew the facts, it was a party to them," on the
ground it "implies Defendant had a duty to admit the facts" to the
Trial Court.

Defendant denies it has such a duty.

Please note the County Attorney does not deny the accuracy of
the statement. It clearly was a party to the facts by its conduct.
Plaintiff submits these facts are, on their face, adverse to
the Counties position.
The real question raised by Defendant is whether a party has
a duty to advise the Courts of known facts adverse to its position?
The answer is in the question.

5

Rule llf Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires candor of
counsel with the Court at all times. Rule 11 does not give counsel
the option of acknowledging only favorable facts.
A denial of known facts also violates 78-51-26, Utah Code
Annotated, "Duties of Attorneys and Counselors;ff
"It is the duty of an Attorney and
Counselor; (4) to employ for the
purposes of maintaining the causes
confided to him such means only as
are consistent with truth, and never
to seek to mislead the Judges by any
artifice or false statement of fact
or law."
The

statute

makes

the duty

to

admit, so

as

to

avoid

"misleading", a direct duty.
This also comes within DR7-101 (3) and (5), stating a lawyer
should not intentionally (3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose
that which it is required by law to reveal, and (5) knowingly make
a false statement of law or fact.

Again, the duty to admit is

positive
In sum, the County has a duty to the Court to admit known
facts, even though adverse.
Point 6.

(Defendant's Brief page 6).

Defendant objects to paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Statement of
Facts.

Its argument is that it was Plaintiff's duty to obtain a

rebuttal affidavit from Ms. McDonald.
There were two party conversations between Plaintiff's counsel
and Ms. McDonald. Plaintiff's counsel has stated his version under
oath.

(Ex. 3, paragraphs 4,9.

Ex. 6, page 4.
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Ex. 8, pages 1,2)

That is probative evidence. If the County Attorney wished to rebut
Plaintiff's counsel's Affidavit, it needed Ms. McDonald.
Plaintiff assumes no such Affidavit was submitted, because Ms.
McDonald advised the County Attorney that she had put together a
substantial

file

in

this

case

based

on

her

contacts

with

Plaintiff's counsel, that his statements were accurate, and she was
not about to sign an Affidavit denying them.
The above is speculation of course.

However, the County

Attorney's failure to produce Ms.McDonald's Affidavit is most
probably explained on that basis than any other.

Certainly, the

County Attorney would have contacted Ms. McDonald about the matter.
The absence of her denial affidavit is strong circumstantial
evidence that she refused to give it.
If Ms. McDonald was not available, she was succeeded in these
negotiations by Colleen Cronin, an attorney on the County Attorneys
staff. (Exhibit 3, paragraph 9, page 3)
Ms. Cronin could have also filed an affidavit. She could have
said she did not, as agent of the County, negotiate the claim. She
too did not do so.
It would seem that what happened here is that Defendant is
trapped by its own tactics.
It denied these contacts to the Trial Court. (Exhibits 2, 4,
and 7) for the reasons, Plaintiff believes, stated above - they
were adverse.
So now, on appeal, the County Attorney can only try to shift
to Plaintiff the responsibility for the Defendant's empty record.
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Point 7.

(Defendant's Brief page 7).

Defendant objects to paragraphs 15 through 21 of Plaintiff's
Statements of Facts.
These deal with Plaintiff's claim that the County Attorney
changed position.
Plaintiff stands by these as appropriate.

They explain the

"why" of what happened. (Plaintiff's Brief, pages 8 and 9)
They are indeed conclusionary as the County claims, but if the
conclusions err, the County Attorney could specifically rebut them,
and has not done so.
Particularly, Plaintiff restates the last portion of her
paragraph 21 in her original Brief which stated:
"Certainly after Plaintiff

filed her Answer

(Exhibit 3)

spelling out the facts, at that point the County had a duty to
admit or deny them.

Instead it simply ignored the facts in its

later pleadings (Exhibit 4, 7). That was wrong. The facts are the
facts.

They may not treated as no-facts."

SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS
Issue joined.
Plaintiff stands on the Summary of Arguments submitted in her
original Brief.
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DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO, I.
PLAINTIFF

ADOPTED

THE

STANDARD OF REVIEW TO

INCORRECT

CONTROL THIS

APPEAL.
The issue is joined.
Plaintiff stands on her statement of the standard of review as
stated in her original Brief at page 10, point I.

DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. II,
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE A PROPER
NOTICE OF CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The issue is joined.
Defendant's Brief fails to state the issue clearly as it
doesn't state the facts clearly.
Plaintiff

stands on her statement of this issue in her

original Brief at page 11, Point II and here at pages 2 and 5 - 8 .
Plaintiff submits two points to clarify.
First, litigants have an obligation to present a matter as
simple as this with good factual clarity to the reviewing Court.
Here, the facts are not clear.
Judge Frederick's two orders (Exhibits 5, and 9) don't state
the facts he finds as proven on which he bases his Orders.
His final Order, (Exhibit 9,) seems to imply that he views the
issue as being one of law, and not fact, that the County Commission
9

must be served directly with a civil claim, or the claim service is
fatally defective, regardless of circumstances.
Confusion in a factual record on appeal aids the prevailing
party.

If the reviewing Court is uncertain as to the facts, it

tends to rely on the Trial Court's view of the facts.
The confusion arises because the facts are contested, rather
than denied.

Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's Statement of

Facts is entitled to be accepted.
The second point is one of definition.
Plaintiff

does

not

contend

that

the

Salt

Lake

County

Commission waived the statutory requirement of service of a claim
on it.

"Waiver" is not the issue.

It is important to any large governmental entity to process a
claim

against

it

as

soon

as

possible,

because

a

prompt

investigation gives it a better report on the facts than a deferred
investigation.
For the same reason, if a claimant thinks they have a strong
liability case, they to want a prompt investigation
negotiations can move from liability to damages.

so that

It was for these

reasons that Plaintiff's counsel called the Salt Lake County
Commission and asked if it had a preferred person to handle intake
of civil claims.
For the same reason it told him to send the claim direct to
Trish McDonald because her job was exactly what both sides wanted she was the person designated to handle intake of all civil claims.
Plaintiff's counsel immediately called Ms. McDonald.

She

confirmed the advice, told him to send the claim to her, and gave
10

her

room

number

and

address.

Plaintiff's

counsel

simply

readdressed the letter to her and mailed it the same day he spoke
to her and the Commission, April 22, 1993,
The next day, April 23, Trish McDonald received and signed for
the letter and stamped it as received on that date by County
Attorney Risk Management.
In all of this there was no waiver on the part of the County
in receiving the claim.

It simply designated a procedure for its

expeditious handling.
Subsequent conduct, in which the claim was negotiated and
partially settled without demur establishes that the County's
designation of Ms. McDonald served for the County as it wished and
directed.
Finally

there

is

nothing

in

evidence

from

the

County

Commission itself denying it referred the claim intake to Ms.
McDonald, nor that it questions in anyway the validity of the
service on it by Plaintiff to her.

DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. Ill
EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL

MAY

NOT

BE

INVOKED AGAINST DEFENDANT.
Issue is joined.
Plaintiff

stands on her statement of this issue in her

original Brief at page 17, Point III and here at pages 2 and 5 - 8 .
The essential difference on this point in the Briefs is that
Defendant seeks to escape acknowledging these facts.
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Accordingly,

Defendant's

Brief

fails

to

meet

the

law

appropriate to them.
The essence of the argument made by Plaintiff is that the
County having negotiated, and even paid for Plaintiff's vehicle
damage, without objection, certainly put Plaintiff in a position of
reasonable reliance that the County accepted and was dealing with,
her claim on its merits.

It did so.

That is a fact.

For this reason, the County Attorney should simply have never
filed a Motion to Dismiss.
If it had intended to mislead the Plaintiff into a mistaken
belief that the matters were being handled in good faith on both
sides, in order to let the one-year statute of limitations run, and
then claim improper notice, this would be unacceptable conduct by
the County and particularly by its licensed attorney.
Plaintiff doubts this occurred.

She doesn't believe Ms.

McDonald or Cronin would so deceive her.
Equally, and this appears most likely from the County's Trial
Court Pleadings, if a different member of the County Attorneys
staff, after receiving the Plaintiff's Complaint decided then, for
the first time to deny adequacy of service, the County then changed
position by ignoring its own active participation, based on the
facts known to it in its file.

This too is unacceptable.

Either way, the County should not be allowed to play such a
game with an injured citizen.
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DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. IV.
STRICT COMPLIANCE

IS REQUIRED BY

UTAH COURTS, NOT "HYPERTECHNICALITY"
The issue is joined.
Plaintiff

stands on her statement of this issue in her

original Brief at page 21, point IV.

DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS ON THIS APPEAL.
The issue is joined.
Plaintiff

stands on her statement of this issue in her

original Brief at page 23, point V.
The strength of Plaintiff's Argument has progressed.
She was on somewhat thin ground in urging that there was some
parallel in the present case and those major issues of public
policy presented in the case she relied on, Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (July 29, 1994) (at page
24 of her original Brief).
The fact that Defendant with its advantages still does
not sguarely deal with the case facts, indicates a substantial
justification for Plaintiff, known by the County to be severely
injured

(Exhibit

1, 3), now receiving

incentive to proper future pleadings.
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fees and costs as an

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that she is entitled to the relief sought in
her original Brief on Appeal.
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